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Abstract
The existing literature on audit opinion shopping provides inconsistent evidence on 
whether such shopping has any association with abnormal audit fees. In this paper, we 
hypothesize that ﬁrms engage in audit opinion shopping and pay an abnormal audit 
fee only when their degree of accounting quality is low. To examine the issue, we group 
ﬁrms on the basis of their change in return on assets (ROA), and show that abnormal 
audit fees improve audit opinions only among ﬁrms that engage local auditors and have 
a low degree of ROA, but report a large increase in ROA, especially when the ROA 
change is the result of abnormal accruals. We find no association between abnormal 
audit fees and audit opinion improvement for other ﬁrms. 
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1. Introduction
Audit opinion shopping has been studied extensively in accounting research. A ﬁrm 
engages in opinion shopping by inﬂuencing or even manipulating its auditor’s decision 
in certain ways to obtain an opinion that is more favorable that that warranted by the 
quality of its accounting information. If such behavior exists, then it would lead to a 
higher degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors and weaken 
auditing’s protective eﬀect on investors.
Empirical research has resulted in inconsistent evidence about whether a ﬁrm can 
influence its audit opinion in China’s capital market by paying excessive fees. Chen, 
Su, and Wu (2005), for example, show that, absent an auditor switch, there is a 
positive correlation between a higher abnormal audit fee and an improvement in audit 
opinion. Employing a diﬀerent research design, Fang and Hong (2008) also ﬁnd that 
abnormal audit fees can lead to a better audit opinion. However, when they used the 
same data selection criterion as Chen, Su, and Wu (2005), the positive relationship 
between abnormal audit fees and audit opinion improvement disappeared. Other 
results reported by Fang and Hong (2008) are also counterintuitive. For example, they 
argue that domestic audit ﬁrms are less likely to allow audit opinion shopping than the 
international Big Four. Such a result is inconsistent with the general perception that the 
Big Four, enjoy a large customer base, are less likely to be pressured by clients.
In this paper, we reconsider the relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit 
opinion change, making several signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to the research methodologies 
employed in the aforementioned papers. We believe that only a ﬁrm with a low degree 
of accounting quality has the incentive to pay an extra audit fee to avoid questions about 
that quality. If a ﬁrm improves its operating results in such a convincing way that its 
audit opinion improves, then there is no need for it to pay an extra fee to its auditors 
to obtain a better opinion. If, in contrast, the ﬁrm’s earnings quality is not convincing, 
then it would have to pay the auditor an extra fee to induce it not to question that 
earnings quality. Hence, we believe that the relationship between abnormal audit fees 
and audit opinion improvement is most likely to exist among ﬁrms with a questionable 
improvement in proﬁtability.
Previous studies have focused on the association between audit opinion improvement 
and abnormal audit fees, but there is one form of opinion shopping whose aim is to 
avoid the worsening of a ﬁrm’s audit opinion. Unlike previous studies demonstrating 
opinion improvement, we observe no opinion change when a ﬁrm successfully maintains 
its audit opinion. In this paper, we extend the existing literature by considering a 
model of audit opinion deterioration, and test the role of abnormal audit fees. We then 
combine this model and our audit opinion improvement model into an ordinal logit 
model of audit opinion change, thus allowing us to combine information on both 
opinion improvement and deterioration. 
We also introduce a number of improvements to the model for computing abnormal 
audit fees. Our model introduces fixed effects to account for unobserved factors in 
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the normal audit fee among diﬀerent ﬁrms, and includes a lagged audit fee to allow 
for systematic changes in the normal fee over time. These changes allow our model to 
integrate two different methods of calculating abnormal audit fees, that is, the ratio 
method employed by Fang and Hong (2008) and the residual method adopted by Chen, 
Su, and Wu (2005). The resulting model signiﬁcantly improves the prediction accuracy 
of audit fees, thus allowing a more accurate determination of abnormal audit fees and 
increasing the eﬃciency of our tests of the hypotheses of interest. Our model also uniﬁes 
the models for audit fee level and fee change, and thus addresses the inconsistency 
between these two types of models that Wu and Liu (2008) pointed out. 
Our empirical results based on these improved models demonstrate that, holding 
the control factors ﬁxed, high abnormal audit fees are associated with a greater chance 
of audit opinion improvements (or less chance of audit opinion deterioration) among 
firms with an abnormally high increase in profitability, but not among firms with 
a normal increase, or a decrease, in profitability. Further analysis indicates that this 
association stems from ﬁrms with a low level of proﬁtability (even after controlling for 
an abnormally high increase in proﬁtability). This ﬁnding is likely to be associated with 
China’s corporate law system, which delists ﬁrms reporting three consecutive years of 
losses.
To further our understanding of the role of accounting, we decompose proﬁtability 
change into operating cash ﬂow change and accrual change. We expect – and empirically 
conﬁrm – an association between high abnormal audit fees and opinion improvement 
among ﬁrms with a proﬁtability increase that is driven by high abnormal accruals rather 
than high cash ﬂows. Taking these ﬁndings together, we conclude that ﬁrms with a low 
degree of accounting quality use abnormal audit fees to obtain more favorable audit 
opinions.
Among ﬁrms that have switched auditors, we ﬁnd no association between audit fees 
and audit opinion change, which is in line with the ﬁndings of Chen, Su, and Wu (2005). 
Unlike Fang and Hong (2008), however, we ﬁnd no evidence of an association between 
abnormal audit fees and audit opinion change among the international Big Four in any 
of our samples.  
2. Literature Review
The typical method of investigating audit opinion shopping in the existing literature 
is to compare the audit opinion before and after an auditor switch. Chow and Rice (1982), 
for example, find that an auditor switch does not improve audit opinion. Krishnan 
and Stephens (1995) too compare auditors’ decision process before and after a switch 
and find no evidence of improvement in the audit opinion. Using an audit opinion 
forecasting model, Lennox (2000) arrives at the opposite result. In their investigation of 
China’s capital market, Gen and Yang (2001) ﬁnd that ﬁrms are more likely to obtain an 
unqualiﬁed than a qualiﬁed opinion after an auditor switch. Li, Huang, and Wang (2001) 
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show that an auditor switch is positively correlated with a qualiﬁed opinion in the prior 
year. Employing a modiﬁed Lennox model, Li and Wu (2002) ﬁnd that, among ﬁrms 
with qualiﬁed opinions in the prior year, switching auditors leads to a slightly lower 
probability of receiving a qualified opinion relative to firms making no such switch, 
although the result is not statistically signiﬁcant. Lu and Tong (2003) ﬁnd no evidence 
of audit opinion shopping in the year 2000, but weak evidence in 2001. Wu and Tan 
(2005) fail to ﬁnd any improvement in audit opinion following an auditor switch. These 
results collectively show that there is no evidence to indicate that ﬁrms can improve their 
audit opinions by switching auditors.
A potential alternative is that a firm may improve its audit opinion by paying a 
higher audit fee to its current auditor, that is, it “purchases” a more favorable audit 
opinion without switching its auditor. Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) investigate ﬁrms that 
received a qualiﬁed opinion between 2000 and 2002, and ﬁnd that, absent an auditor 
switch, a high abnormal audit fee is associated with an improvement in auditing 
outcome (with improvement in both proﬁtability and audit opinion) in the subsequent 
year. Their ﬁnding indicates that an auditor’s independence may be negatively aﬀected 
by the economic incentive provided by its clients. 
Extending their sample to include all ﬁrms in China’s stock market and employing 
several diﬀerent measures of abnormal audit fees, Fang and Hong (2008) also ﬁnd a 
positive relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit opinion improvement. 
However, the inclusion of all ﬁrms in their regression leads to biased estimation results, 
as firms that received an unqualified opinion in the prior year are unable to realize 
any further improve in their audit opinion. The correct method would be either to 
exclude these firms, as they did in their robustness study following the approach 
adopted by Chen, Su, and Wu (2005), or, equivalently, to include indicator variables 
for the prior year’s audit opinion. When Fang and Hong (2008) excluded ﬁrms with a 
prior unqualiﬁed opinion in their robustness study, however, there was no longer any 
signiﬁcant relationship between abnormal audit fees and audit opinion improvement, 
even through their sample size was several times that of Chen, Su, and Wu’s (2005). In 
addition, their results also indicate that local audit ﬁrms allow less opinion shopping 
than their international Big Four counterparts. This ﬁnding is counterintuitive, as it is 
generally believed that the Big Four have many more clients than local ﬁrms and are thus 
less likely to be concerned about the proﬁts from each.
The current paper extends the existing research in several ways. First, we classify ﬁrms 
based on accounting quality, which is similar to the approach adopted by Chen, Su, 
and Wu (2005). The model we adopt, however, bears greater similarity to that of Fang 
and Hong (2008), as it uses the audit opinion as the dependent variable, which is more 
intuitive and easier to interpret than the model in Chen, Su, and Wu (2005).
Second, and importantly, this research addresses the determination of abnormal 
audit fees. Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) employ a cross-sectional regression to determine 
the expected audit fee. However, in addition to known factors such as size, these fees are 
determined by a number of other unobserved factors. When unobserved  factors exist, 
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the residuals capture these factors and thus lead to bias in the abnormal fee. Fang and 
Hong (2008) measure an abnormal audit fee as a change in the audit fee-to-assets ratio, 
a method that overcomes some of the problems in Chen, Su, and Wu (2005), but creates 
new problems because the change in this ratio is driven by predictable factors and thus is 
not abnormal.
In this paper, we improve the audit fee model by including ﬁxed eﬀects and a lagged 
audit fee. Fixed eﬀects capture unobserved factors in the audit fee, whereas the inclusion 
of a lagged audit fee allows dynamic change in these factors. Moreover, it allows us to 
integrate the two diﬀerent approaches in Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) and Fang and Hong 
(2008), thus ensuring that our model includes both models as nested submodels. This 
approach signiﬁcantly improves the accuracy of our abnormal audit fee calculations.
Third, the sample period in both Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) and Fang and Hong (2008) 
is 2000-2002, whereas we consider the 2002-2008 period, which results in a much 
larger sample and reﬂects the more up-to-date situation in China’s audit market. Finally, 
we also include an audit opinion deterioration model, which provides independent 
verification of our hypotheses and adds greater credibility to our results. An ordinal 
logit model is then formed to combine information on both opinion improvement and 
deterioration.
3. Hypotheses Development and Research Design
To evaluate whether a ﬁrm pays a higher audit fee to obtain a more favorable audit 
opinion, it is necessary to understand the incentives a ﬁrm would have for doing so. 
Absent such incentives, ﬁrms are unlikely to make any extra payment. Our analysis is 
built upon this foundation.
A firm’s need to obtain a more favorable audit opinion depends on two factors. 
First, we need to decide whether it is seeking to improve its audit opinion or maintain 
an already favorable opinion. Second, the foundation of a more favorable opinion is 
questionable. If a ﬁrm’s earnings increase is solid and convincing, then the audit opinion 
will reﬂect that increase, and the ﬁrm thus has no need to oﬀer its auditors an incentive 
to obtain a better opinion. If, in contrast, the ﬁrm’s earnings increase has been obtained 
through questionable accounting practices, then it must ﬁnd a way, such as paying a 
higher audit fee, to persuade its auditors to certify those earnings and give it a better 
audit opinion than the facts merit. 
To proxy for the quality of a proﬁtability increase, we consider two measures. The 
ﬁrst measures whether that increase is normal. Although a high level of proﬁtability does 
not necessarily imply an accounting quality problem, it is relatively unlikely that a ﬁrm’s 
return on assets (ROA) would undergo a sudden and signiﬁcant increase.  
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Hypothesis I: Among ﬁrms with an abnormally large increase in proﬁtability, a high 
abnormal audit fee is associated with an improvement in audit opinion. Among other 
firms, there is no association between an abnormal audit fee and an audit opinion 
change.
The second measure considers an abnormal increase in accruals, which are relatively 
easy to manipulate. If a firm’s profitability increase stems from a large increase in 
accruals, then that increase is likely to be of low quality. 
To test this hypothesis, we employ the following model, which is similar to that in 
Fang and Hong (2008).
Logit(Imp=1) = ß0 + ß1 Abfee + ß2 Size + ß3 ΔROA + ß4 ΔLEV + ß5 Growth
      + ß6 Loss + ß7 Lastloss + ß8 Switch + ß9 Switch*Abfee 
      + ß10 Big4 + Prior Opinion Dummies + Year Dummies,         (1)
where Imp is a binary variable that indicates an improvement in audit opinion, 
Abfee is the variable of interest, that is, the abnormal audit fee, and ΔROA is the change 
in ROA (see Table 1 for definitions of the other variables). Among firms that have 
abnormally large values for ΔROA, we expect ß1 > 0; among the remaining ﬁrms, we 
expect ß1 = 0. Note that the model should include only those ﬁrms that have received 
qualiﬁed opinions, as these are the only ﬁrms that can have had an improvement in 
audit opinion. 
The concern for ﬁrms whose audit opinion faces a downgrade would be to avoid 
that downgrade. To do so, they must show better proﬁtability than is actually the case 
and persuade their auditors to accept this nominal proﬁtability, potentially by paying a 
higher audit fee. An abnormal audit fee may thus reduce the likelihood of audit opinion 
deterioration.
Hypothesis II: Among ﬁrms with an abnormally large increase in proﬁtability, a high 
abnormal audit fee is associated with a lower probability of audit opinion deterioration. 
Among other ﬁrms, there is no association between an abnormal audit fee and an audit 
opinion change.
The model employed to test Hypothesis II is similar to Model (1), but includes the 
dependent variable, Det, which is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the audit 
opinion in this period is worse than that in the prior period and 0 if it is better or 
unchanged. This model is speciﬁed as follows.
Logit(Det=1) = ß0 + ß1 Abfee + ß2 Size + ß3 ΔROA + ß4 ΔLEV + ß5 Growth
      + ß6 Loss + ß7 Lastloss + ß8 Switch + ß9 Switch*Abfee 
      + ß10 Big4 + Prior Opinion Dummies + Year Dummies.             (2)
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Based on this coding, a coefficient has a meaning opposite to that in Model 
(1). Hence, Hypothesis II states that ß1 < 0 for firms with abnormally large ΔROA 
values and ß1 = 0 for other ﬁrms. Note that the model includes only ﬁrms with prior 
opinions better than the worst option (a disclaimer or adverse opinion) to ensure that 
deterioration is possible. 
Given that an audit opinion may either improve or deteriorate, a better approach 
is to integrate both types of change. To do so, we employ an ordinal model with four 
categories, 0, –1, –2, and –3, to represent the four types of audit opinions ranging from 
best to worst. Assuming that a ﬁrm’s audit opinion during t-1 is OPt-1 = j, we denote 
the conditional probability of the audit opinion in the t-th period, OPt = i, as Prob(OPt 
= i | OPt-1 = j). The dependent variable of this ordinal model is the logit of probability, 
Prob(OPt≤i | OPt-1=j), which is the conditional probability that the opinion is no worse 
than i, given that the prior opinion is j. The ordinal model takes the form
 Logit(OPt≤i | OPt-1=j) = ßi,0 – ß
j,0 – ß1 Abfee – ß2 Size – ß3ΔROA 
                        – ß4 ΔLEV – ß5 Growth – ß6 Loss – ß7 Lastloss – ß8 Switch 
                 – ß9 Switch*Abfee – ß10 Big4 – Year Dummies.                (3)
The coefficients presented in the standard ordinal model are the opposite of the 
estimated value, and thus each ß coincides with that of a logit model when the data are 
binary (0-1). Note that for Model (3), we include all of the ﬁrms and dummy variables 
for the prior audit opinion, ßj,0. The following hypothesis summarizes Hypotheses I and 
II.
Hypothesis III: Among firms with abnormally large increases in profitability, a high 
abnormal fee is associated with a higher probability of a better audit opinion, that is, ß1 
> 0. Among other ﬁrms, there is no association between an abnormal audit fee and the 
audit opinion level, that is, ß1 = 0.
To deﬁne an abnormal increase in proﬁtability, we use two diﬀerent criteria, ΔROA > 
P75 (75th percentile) and ΔROA > P90 (90th percentile). We thus consider three diﬀerent 
subsamples for each hypothesis: ΔROA ≤ P75, ΔROA > P75, and ΔROA > P90.
In China, a listed firm receives special treatment (ST) if it suffers a loss in two 
consecutive years, and it is delisted if that loss continues into the third year. Firms are 
thus often under pressure to manage their earnings to avoid these possibilities. Firms 
that do so successfully usually have positive, though a low level of, proﬁtability. They 
also need to persuade their auditors to accept their ﬁnancial reports and issue a favorable 
audit opinion. Therefore, for ﬁrms with an abnormal increase in proﬁtability, we also 
partition the sample into low (ROA < 0.01) and high (ROA > 0.01) proﬁtability groups. 
We expect that audit opinion shopping exists mainly in the former group.
We now consider the estimation of abnormal audit fees. Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) 
adopt a residual method by constructing a regression model of the audit fee and 
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obtaining the abnormal fee as the residual. Many factors are known to aﬀect normal 
audit fees (see, for example, Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; and Francis 
and Stokes, 1986), including the client’s assets, audit complexity, leverage, prior audit 
opinion, proﬁtability, and auditor type (Big Four versus non-Big Four). Recent research 
has also found that the price premiums charged by international Big Four auditors have 
increased signiﬁcantly relative to those of domestic Chinese ﬁrms over the sample period 
(see Cai, Sun, and Ye, 2009). Hence, we also include an interaction variable between 
the time and Big Four dummies. However, there are many other factors that aﬀect the 
audit fee but which cannot be observed. If they are not taken into account in the audit 
fee model, then they will be captured in the abnormal audit fee. In addition, certain 
unobserved factors ﬂuctuate over time. To account for these factors, we include a ﬁxed 
eﬀect and a lagged audit fee in our audit fee model:
LnFee = ßo + ß1 LagLnfee + ß2 Size + ß3 Growth + ß4 ROA 
+ ß5 LEV + ß6 CATA + ß7 Switch + ß8 Big4 + ß9 Big4*Time 
+ Prior Audit Opinion + Year Dummies + Firm ﬁxed eﬀect + ε,               (4)
where LnFee is the logarithm of the audit fee, and LagLnFee is the lagged value of 
the dependent variable (see Table 1 for deﬁnitions of the other variables). The abnormal 
audit fee is measured as the residuals, ε, from the model.
An alternative method of measuring abnormal audit fees, that is, the ratio method, is 
used in Fang and Hong (2008), where an abnormal fee is deﬁned as 
ΔLn(Fee/Assets) = Ln(Audit Feet /Assetst ) – Ln(Audit Feet – 1/Assetst – 1).            (5)
Although this measure is more eﬀective than that adopted by Chen, Su, and Wu 
(2005) in eliminating the effects of the unobserved determinants of the audit fee, it 
assumes that the audit fee is proportional to assets, which is generally not true. Most 
empirical results show that this fee does not usually double when a client’s assets double. 
In addition, this measure may also be driven by many predictable factors that, by their 
nature, are not abnormal. 
Abnormal audit fees, measured as the residuals from Model (4), can also be regarded 
as a generalization of the ratio method because Equation (4) can be rewritten as 
ΔLn(Fee/Assets) = ßo + ß1’ LagLnfee + ß2 Size + ß3’ Growth + ß4 ROA
            + ß5 LEV + ß6 CATA + ß7 Switch + ß8 Big4 + ß9 Big4*Time 
                               + Prior Audit Opinion + Year Dummies + Firm ﬁxed eﬀect + ε.(4’)
Note that Models (4) and (4’) are mathematically equivalent, and thus the residuals 
are the same. In other words, the residuals from Model (4) are also the residuals from 
Model (4’) that regress ΔLn(Fee/Assets) on the predictors. The Model (4) residuals 
thus also represent an improvement over the ratio diﬀerence in Fang and Hong (2008), 
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with adjustment to the predictable factors. The new method introduced herein uniﬁes 
and reﬁnes the residuals method employed by Chen, Su, and Wu (2005) and the ratio 
method employed by Fang and Hong (2008).
Table 1. Deﬁnition of Variables
Optype 0 = unqualiﬁed opinion; –1 = unqualiﬁed opinion with explanatory notes; –2 = qualiﬁed opinion 
with or without explanatory notes; and –3 = disclaimer or adverse opinion.
Imp =1 when Optypet > Optypet – 1, and 0 otherwise.
Det =1 when Optypet < Optypet – 1, and 0 otherwise.
LnFee Logarithm of audit fee.
Abfee Abnormal audit fee, calculated as the residuals of Model (4).
Size Logarithm of total assets at ﬁscal year end.
ΔROA Change in ROA, where ROA is net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
ΔLEV Change in leverage, where leverage is total liabilities divided by total assets.
Growth = ΔSize is the growth rate of total assets.
Loss = 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise.
Lastloss Lag variable of Loss.
Lastop=-1 = 1 if the prior period audit opinion is “unqualiﬁed with explanations.” 
Lastop=-2 = 1 if the prior period audit opinion is “qualiﬁed” with or without explanations. 
Lastop=-3 = 1 if the prior period audit opinion is negative, or if the auditor refuses to express an opinion.
Switch = 1 if the auditor is diﬀerent from that in the prior period, and 0 otherwise.
Big4 = 1 if the auditor is one of the international Big Four, and 0 otherwise.
ΔACR Abnormal change in accruals. 
CATA Current assets/total assets.
LagLnFee Logarithm of prior period audit fee.
Time Year = 2005, such that years 2002-2008 are coded as -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our initial sample includes all public ﬁrms with A shares in China’s stock market. 
Financial data and auditor information are obtained from the CISMAR database. 
After removing ﬁrms with data missing for any of the variables, our sample consists of 
7,028 ﬁrm-years. Auditor mergers or name changes are not treated as auditor switches. 
Because China switched to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2006, 
which could potentially have resulted in changes in proﬁtability and other accounting 
measures, we also conduct a robustness check by re-running our tests on the pre-2006 
sample, but the results remain qualitatively the same. 
Table 2 describes the transition matrix of auditor opinions. Of the 7,028 ﬁrm-years, 
the audit opinion improved in 342 cases (4.9%), remained unchanged in 6,351 cases 
(90.4%), and worsened in 355 cases (4.8%). Of the 659 cases in which the ﬁrms started 
out with a qualiﬁed opinion or worse, 51.9% received a better opinion in the following 
year. 
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Table 2. Distribution and Transition Matrix of Audit Opinions
Audit opinion at period t
0 –1 –2 –3 Total
Audit opinion at
period t-1 
0 6,106 154 86 23 6,369
–1 185 149 25 26 385
–2 66 33 71 15 111
–3 8 31 9 41 163
Total 6,365 367 129 167 7,028
 
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. We winsorized the top 
and bottom 1% of extreme observations for ROA, ΔROA, ΔLEV, and Growth, which 
reduced the impact of extreme observations by reducing the effective sample size. If 
extreme observations are not controlled for, then the results may be unreliable and driven 
by a few peculiar ﬁrms. The statistics provided in Table 3 are based on the winsorized 
data. The sample size is 7,028.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean StDev Minimum Maximum
Imp 0.05 0.22 0 1
Det 0.95 0.21 0 1
LnFee 13.01 0.53 10.31 16.59
Abfee 0 0.20 -1.98 2.39
Size 21.26 1.03 18.03 27.30
ROA 0.017 0.10 -0.85 0.40
ΔROA -0.01 0.11 -1.02 1.54
ACR 0.001 0.09 -0.96 0.75
LEV 0.50 0.28 0.07 3.89
ΔLEV -0.03 0.12 -0.48 1.43
CATA 0.52 0.20 0.07 0.98
Growth 0.10 0.24 -0.82 1.56
Loss 0.14 0.35 0 1
Big4 0.06 0.23 0 1
Switch 0.10 0.30 0 1
Table 4 presents the correlation coeﬃcients. This table demonstrates a low degree of 
correlation among the variables, which suggests that there is no serious multicollinearity 
in the regression models. We also examine the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) to test 
multicollinearity. The VIF values are all less than 3, which is significantly below the 
critical value of 10 for multicollinearity.
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Table 4. Correlation Coeﬃcients (Lower Triangle is Pearson, Upper Triangle is Spearman)
Imp Det LnFee Abfee Size ΔROA LEV CATA Growth Big4 Switch
Imp 1 0.051 -0.019 0.010 -0.125 0.162 0.208 0.005 -0.095 -0.037 0.070
Det 0.051 1 0.045 -0.017 0.110 0.222 -0.082 0.000 0.193 0.031 -0.036
LnFee -0.021 0.049 1 0.369 0.619 0.013 0.080 -0.027 0.098 0.326 -0.007
Abfee -0.011 -0.010 0.293 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.021 0.000 0.000
Size -0.116 0.107 0.596 -0.014 1 0.008 -0.064 -0.105 0.310 0.267 -0.008
ΔROA 0.136 0.183 0.011 -0.009 0.020 1 0.157 -0.014 0.121 -0.002 -0.007
LEV 0.141 -0.089 0.167 -0.011 0.119 0.092 1 0.050 -0.107 -0.065 0.030
CATA 0.005 0.001 -0.025 0. 000 -0.099 0.004 0.088 1 0.074 -0.050 0.007
Growth -0.108 0.199 0.097 -0.038 0.295 0.038 -0.128 0.070 1 0.043 -0.054
Big4 -0.037 0.031 0.229 -0.010 0.204 -0.005 -0.070 -0.046 0.048 1 0.008
Switch 0.070 -0.036 -0.016 -0.003 -0.012 0.029 0.045 0.008 -0.051 0.008 1
 
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Estimation of Audit Fee Model
To estimate the abnormal audit fee, we use Equation (4), which is listed in Table 5 
as Model (III). For comparison purposes, we also include two submodels: Model (I) is a 
conventional audit fee model that does not include either ﬁxed eﬀects or a lagged audit 
fee, similar to the model in Chen, Su, and Wu (2005). Model (II) adds ﬁxed eﬀects, but 
no lagged audit fee.
Table 5 presents the results of all three models. Model (I) produces results similar to 
those of a typical audit fee model, where ﬁrm size (Size), leverage (LEV), and the current 
assets ratio (CATA) all have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, 0.31 (t = 59.5), 0.17 (t = 
8.86), and 0.135 (t = 5.76), respectively, thus indicating that the audit fee increases with 
ﬁrm size and audit risk. The international Big Four have a signiﬁcant price premium over 
local ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of Big4 is 0.462 (t = 21.37), thus indicating that in 2005 (Time 
= 0), these ﬁrms enjoyed a premium of e0.462 – 1 = 58.7%. The interaction term for Big4 
and Time has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.143 (t = 13.59), which indicates 
that the premium increased over the sample period. The coeﬃcient reduces slightly when 
ﬁxed eﬀects and the lagged audit fee are included, thus showing that the trend cannot be 
attributed to a change in the sample. 
Model (I) includes the most important determinants of the audit fee. Its R2, 39.28%, 
is also roughly in line with the results obtained in existing audit fee research. In Model 
(II), however, the R2 increases very substantially to 81.89%, which indicates that the 
ﬁxed eﬀects make a highly signiﬁcant contribution. In other words, a very large portion 
of the audit fee that is attributable to diﬀerences in individual ﬁrms cannot be explained 
by known factors. If ﬁxed eﬀects were not taken into account, then the diﬀerence among 
ﬁrms would be classiﬁed as abnormal audit fees.
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Table 5. Regression Models for Audit Fee
      Model (I) Model (II) Model (III)
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
LagLnFee 0.202 17.28***
Size 0.310 59.50*** 0.219 20.52*** 0.184 17.43***
Growth -0.185 -8.37*** -0.072 -4.46*** -0.036 -2.26**
LEV 0.170 8.86*** 0.097 4.99*** 0.087 4.59***
CATA 0.135 5.76*** 0.004 0.10 -0.001 -0.02
Lastloss -0.002 -0.12 -0.012 -1.09 -0.009 -0.78
ΔROA 0.013 0.30 0.018 0.61 0.014 0.48
Big4 0.462 21.37*** 0.329 12.87*** 0.296 11.86***
Time 0.015 5.00*** 0.023 10.28*** 0.019 8.68***
Big4*Time 0.143 13.59*** 0.126 17.01*** 0.105 14.33***
Switch -0.029 -1.80* -0.013 -1.27 -0.019 -1.83**
Lastop=-1 0.086 3.83*** 0.048 3.03*** 0.043 2.78***
Lastop=-2 0.110 3.53*** 0.056 2.47** 0.047 2.12**
Lastop=-3 0.113 2.39*** 0.025 0.75 0.038 1.13
Intercept 6.279 55.74*** 8.321 36.84*** 6.439 26.23***
Year included included included
Firm eﬀects included included
R2(adj) 39.28% 81.89% 82.81%
Sample size 7,028 7,028 7,028
*, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Model (III) introduces the lagged audit fee variable to account for a time series 
change in a ﬁrm’s audit fee. Its R2 is 82.81%, a statistically signiﬁcant increase from the 
81.89% of Model (II). The lagged audit fee has a coeﬃcient of 0.202 (t = 17.28), which 
is as signiﬁcant as ﬁrm size in this regression. 
When Model (III) is rewritten into Equation (4’), we obtain an R2 of 61.4% (unlisted), 
which shows that Fang and Hong’s (2008) abnormal audit fee measure is predictable to 
a large extent. Model (III) produces an abnormal audit fee that excludes the predictable 
component. Hence, for the following analysis, we employ the residuals from Model (III). 
5.2. Abnormal Audit Fee and Audit Opinion Change: Empirical Results
Table 6 lists the estimation results for the audit opinion improvement and deterioration 
models. For each model, we consider three subsamples based on ΔROA: ΔROA ≤ P75, 
ΔROA > P75, and ΔROA > P90, where Px is the x-th percentile. The results for the ΔROA 
> P75 and ΔROA > P90 subsamples are provided as robustness checks.
We first consider the audit opinion improvement model shown in Table 6. This 
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model is estimated for the sample of ﬁrms that started out with qualiﬁed opinions. In 
all three cases, the most signiﬁcant variable is “Loss,” which has negative and signiﬁcant 
coeﬃcients (-1.063, -1.743, and -2.12, respectively), thus indicating that loss is a major 
factor in reducing the likelihood of audit opinion improvement. An increase in leverage 
(ΔLEV) is also negatively associated with such improvement, whereas asset growth has 
a positive association, although it is not always signiﬁcant. These results are consistent 
with intuition and the existing literature.
 
Table 6. Audit Opinion Improvement and Deterioration Models
Model (1): Audit Opinion Improvement          Model (2): Audit Opinion Deterioration         
ΔROA ≤ P75 ΔROA > P75 ΔROA > P90 ΔROA ≤ P75 ΔROA > P75 ΔROA > P90
Abfee
-0.205 1.610 2.598 0.477 -3.000 -2.471
(-0.24) (2.02**) (2.86***) (1.23) (-2.43**) (-1.76*)
Switch *Abfee
-2.099 -0.506 -1.731 1.263 3.406 3.255
(-1.22) (-0.32) (-0.99) (1.39) (1.32) (1.15)
Sum
-2.304 1.103 0.857 1.740 0.406 0.784
(-1.54) (0.78) (0.55) (2.12**) (0.18) (0.32)
Big4
-0.507 -0.685 -2.386 -0.371
(-0.54) (-0.64) (-1.38) (-0.89)
ΔROA
0.260 -0.872 -0.597 -4.102 -1.048 -2.171
(0.31) (-1.18) (-0.75) (-6.62***) (-0.59) (-0.97)
Size
0.201 0.076 -0.062 0.088 -0.309 -0.374
(1.45) (0.48) (-0.33) (1.06) (-1.42) (-1.38)
Loss
-1.063 -1.743 -2.120 2.085 2.026 2.084
(-3.11***) (-4.71***) (-4.79***) (11.48***) (5.07***) (4.66***)
Lastloss
-0.549 0.095 0.241 0.353 1.905 0.962
(-1.36) (0.24) (0.35) (1.66) (3.47***) (1.18)
ΔLEV
-1.360 -0.449 -0.631 1.555 1.848 2.134
(-1.73*) (-0.74) (-1.05) (2.20***) (1.34) (1.41)
Growth
1.224 0.984 0.445 -1.089 -1.694 -1.107
(2.24**) (1.83*) (0.72) (-2.93***) (-1.91*) (-1.12)
Switch
0.520 -0.807 -0.439 0.063 0.527 0.43
(1.56) (-2.27**) (-1.05) (0.27) (1.11) (0.76)
Lastop=-1
-0.326 -2.466 -2.476 0.020 -0.502 -0.155
(-1.08) (-4.89***) (-4.498***) (0.08) (-1.10) (-0.31)
Lastop=-2
-1.439 -1.365 -1.293
(-2.75**) (-2.38**) (-3.30***)
Lastop=-3
0.134
(0.24)
Intercept
-4.374 1.715 3.389 -6.480 1.641 4.037
(-1.43) (0.52) (0.87) (-3.60***) (0.36) (0.70)
N 349 306 237 4,903 1,479 566
Pseudo-R2 21.21% 18.59% 22.01% 29.67% 31.74% 26.36%
Notes: 1. All models include the year dummies. The coeﬃcients are not displayed.
 2.*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The t-values are given in 
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parentheses.
 3. The row entitled “Sum” gives the coeﬃcient sum of Abfee and Switch*Abfee.
 4. The coeﬃcients of Lastop= -j are given in the equation (3) as ß j,0.
For firms with profitability not exceeding the 75th percentile (ΔROA ≤ P75), the 
coeﬃcient of abnormal audit fee (Abfee) is -0.205 (t = -0.24), which is not statistically 
signiﬁcant. This result indicates that among ﬁrms with no abnormally large proﬁtability 
increase, there is no evidence of an association between abnormal audit fees and an audit 
opinion change. Among those with ΔROA > P75 and ΔROA > P90, the coeﬃcients of 
Abfee are 1.61 and 2.598 (t = 2.02 and 2.86), which are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. These results indicate that among firms with an abnormally large 
proﬁtability increase, a higher audit fee is associated with a greater likelihood of audit 
opinion improvement, after controlling for all of the other variables, which is consistent 
with Hypothesis I.
In the estimation, the coeﬃcient for the Big Four indicator variable (Big4) is negative 
but statistically insigniﬁcant in all cases. The interaction between this indicator and an 
abnormal audit fee is insigniﬁcant (not shown in the table) for the ΔROA ≤ P75 sample, 
and we lack suﬃcient data on Big Four ﬁrms in the other cases. Therefore, unlike Fang 
and Hong (2008), we find no evidence to suggest that a high abnormal audit fee is 
more associated with audit opinion improvement for Big Four ﬁrms than for their local 
counterparts.
Model (2) in Table 6 is the audit opinion deterioration model. Note that the 
meanings of the coeﬃcients here are opposite to those in the audit opinion improvement 
model. These estimation results show that Loss, Lastloss, and ΔLEV tend to have positive 
coeﬃcients, thus indicating that a loss and an increase in ﬁnancial leverage are associated 
with audit opinion deterioration. The ΔROA variable has a negative coeﬃcient, which 
suggests that decreases in ROA are also associated with such deterioration, which is 
intuitive. 
For firms with ΔROA ≤ P75, the coefficient of Abfee is 0.477 (t = 1.23), which 
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0. There is thus no evidence to suggest that higher 
abnormal fees lead to better audit opinions for these ﬁrms. For ﬁrms with ΔROA > P75, 
however, the coeﬃcient of Abfee is –3.0 (t = -2.43), signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This 
result indicates that among ﬁrms with an abnormally large proﬁtability increase, a high 
abnormal fee is associated with less likelihood of avoiding audit opinion deterioration, 
which is consistent with audit opinion shopping. A similar result also holds for ﬁrms 
with ΔROA > P90 (coeﬃcient = -2.471. t = -1.76, signiﬁcant at the 10% level). These 
results support Hypothesis II. 
For ﬁrms that have undergone an auditor switch, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients of the 
interaction term of auditor switch and Abfee have signs opposite to those of Abfee for 
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the ΔROA > P75 and ΔROA > P90 subsamples in both the audit improvement and 
deterioration models. The sums of the coefficients for Abfee are insignificant, which 
indicates that there is no evidence of an association being the payment of a high audit 
fee and a better audit opinion in the ΔROA > P75 or ΔROA > P90 subsamples. This 
result is consistent with that reported by Chen, Su, and Wu (2005).
In Table 7, we integrate the audit opinion improvement and deterioration models 
into the ordinal model of audit opinion. For comparison purposes, we employ two 
diﬀerent measures of abnormal audit fees: ﬁrst, the Model (4) measure in this paper and, 
second, the ratio method in Fang and Wu (2008). It can be seen that the lagged audit 
opinion variables become much more signiﬁcant in Table 7 than they were in Table 6. 
The diﬀerence is because we use all observations in the sample in Table 7, and thus the 
prior audit opinion becomes highly signiﬁcant. All of the lagged opinion dummies have 
a negative coeﬃcient, thus indicating that, compared to ﬁrms with a prior unqualiﬁed 
opinion, those with a prior qualiﬁed opinion have a much lower probability of receiving 
an unqualiﬁed opinion in the current period. We can also see from Table 7 that the Loss, 
Lastloss, and ΔLEV variables have a negative association with audit opinion, whereas 
Size and Growth have a possible association with it. These results are similar to those in 
Table 6, but generally appear to be more signiﬁcant here. 
Table 7. Ordinal Logit Model for Audit Opinion
Abnormal Audit Fee from Model (4) Abnormal Audit fee from Model (5)
ΔROA≤P75
ΔROA>P75
ΔROA>P90 ΔROA≤P75 ΔROA>P75 ΔROA>P90
All  ROA<0.01 ROA>0.01
Abfee
-0.383 1.817 3.616 -0.114 2.206 -0.180 0.518 0.772
(-1.11) (3.11***) (3.75***) (-0.14) (3.45***) (-0.87) (1.40) (1.91*)
Switch 
*Abfee
-1.616 -1.055 -3.859 1.525 -1.840 -0.976 0.361 0.054
(-2.23**) (-0.94) (-1.50) (1.23) (-1.37) (-2.41**) (0.79) (0.10)
Sum
-2.000 0.762 0.366 1.41 0.366 -1.155 0.879 0.825
(-3.13***) (0.79) (0.31) (1.43) (0.31) (-3.07***) (2.09**) (1.70*)
Big4
0.188 0.070 -1.422 -0.318 0.224 0.002 -0.533
(0.53) (0.09) (-1.47) (-0.37) (0.63) (0.00) (-0.62)
ΔROA
2.884 -0.364 -1.008 -0.426 -0.101 2.931 -0.278 -0.012
(5.63***) (-0.66) (-0.79) (-0.66) (-0.17) (5.53***) (-0.50) (-0.02)
Size
0.005 0.267 0.049 0.272 0.173 -0.001 0.277 0.194
(0.06) (2.31**) (0.27) (1.70) (1.27) (0.01) (2.39**) (1.42)
Loss
-1.876 -1.861 -1.609              -2.218 -1.879 -1.814 -2.176
(-11.93***) (-7.05***) (-4.88***)              (-7.31***) (-11.95***) (-6.83***) (-7.13***)
Lastloss
-0.220 -0.882 -0.362 -0.515 -0.213 -0.828 -0.468
(-1.17) (-3.09***) (-.97) (-1.17) (-1.14) (-2.92***) (-1.08)
ΔLEV
-1.315 -0.536 -2.905 0.196 -0.845 -1.228 -0.621 -0.946
(-2.45**) (-1.11) (-2.83***) (0.31) (-1.58) (-2.30**) (-1.29) (-1.78**)
Growth 1.264 0.936 2.017 0.320 0.445 0.922 1.547 1.230
(3.97***) (2.29***) (2.54**) (0.66) (1.03) (2.30**) (2.87***) (2.12**)
Switch 0.012 -0.448 -0.423 -0.864 -0.177 0.078 -0.436 -0.144
(0.07) (-1.75*) (-0.97) (-2.49) (-0.57) (0.39) (-1.70*) (-0.46)
Lastop=-1
-2.548 -2.767 -2.028 -4.014 -2.746 -2.410 -2.765 -2.705
(-14.65***) (-10.61***) (-5.56***) (-8.84***) (-8.65***) (-14.59***) (-10.58***) (-8.58***)
Lastop=-2
-3.000 -3.403 -2.317 -5.142 -3.563 -3.020 -3.376 -3.488
(-12.96***) (-10.86***) (-5.09***) (-9.94***) (-9.30***) (-13.02***) (-10.77***) (-9.19***)
Lastop=-3
-4.825 -3.930 -2.653 -4.975 -4.006 -4.693 -3.968 -4.003
(-9.45***) (-10.22***) (-4.30***) (-8.43***) (-9.13***) (-9.31***) (-10.25***) (-9.08***)
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Abnormal Audit Fee from Model (4) Abnormal Audit fee from Model (5)
ΔROA≤P75
ΔROA>P75
ΔROA>P90 ΔROA≤P75 ΔROA>P75 ΔROA>P90
All  ROA<0.01 ROA>0.01
Cut1
-4.120 1.350 -2.281 0.821 -0.144 -4.275 1.581 0.377
(-2.67**) (0.56) (-0.58) (0.24) (-0.05) (-2.77***) (0.65) (0.13)
Cut2
-5.474 -0.741 -4.605 -1.219 -2.439 -5.632 -0.494 -1.889
(-3.55***) (-0.31) (-1.16) (-0.36) (-0.86) (-3.64***) (-0.20) (-0.66)
Cut3
-7.263 -2.431 -6.257 -3.252 -4.010 -7.433 -2.171 -3.449
(-4.68***) (-1.00) (-1.57) (-0.94) (-1.41) (-4.77***) (-0.89) (-1.21)
N 4,940 1,687 313 1,374 697 4,940 1,687 697
Pseudo-R2 38.36% 45.36% 35.12% 46.86% 38.95% 36.77% 41.87% 36.96%
Notes: 1. All models include year dummies, although the coeﬃcients and t-values are not presented.
 2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 3. “Cut1,” “Cut2,” and “Cut3” represent the intercepts ßi,0 , i = -1, -2, and -3 for the ordinal model.
 4. The row entitled “Sum” gives the coeﬃcient sum of Abfee and Switch*Abfee.
 5. The coeﬃcients of Lastop= -j are given in the equation (3) as ß j,0.
We ﬁrst consider the model in which abnormal audit fees are estimated from Model 
(4). For ﬁrms with ΔROA ≤ P75, the coeﬃcient for Abfee is -0.383 (t = -1.11), thus 
suggesting no signiﬁcant relationship between Abfee and audit opinion. For ΔROA > 
P75 (the entire sample) and ΔROA > P90, the coeﬃcients of Abfee are 1.817 (t = 3.11) 
and 2.206 (t = 3.45), respectively, both signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. These coeﬃcients 
indicate that, among ﬁrms with an abnormal proﬁtability increase, a higher abnormal 
audit fee is associated with a better audit opinion, thus supporting Hypothesis III. 
Among ﬁrms that have switched auditors, however, the coeﬃcients for Abfee (as the sum 
of the coeﬃcient for Abfee and Switch*Abfee) are signiﬁcant for both ΔROA > P75 (the 
entire sample) and ΔROA > P90, which indicates that among ﬁrms with an abnormal 
proﬁtability increase, abnormal audit fees play no signiﬁcant role in improving audit 
opinion when there has been an auditor switch.
One of the major incentives for earnings manipulation in China’s capital market is to 
avoid reporting a loss, as ﬁrms with two consecutive losses are given an ST designation, 
and those with three consecutive losses are delisted. We thus separate the ΔROA > 
P75 subsample into two groups, a low profitability group (ROA ≤ 0.01) and a high 
proﬁtability group (ROA > 0.01). We use 0.01 as the threshold simply for convenience. 
The coeﬃcients of Abfee diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the two groups. For the former (ROA 
≤ 0.01), Abfee is highly signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient = 3.616, t = 3.75), whereas for the latter 
(ROA > 0.01), it is not signiﬁcant (coeﬃcient = -0.114, t = -0.14). This ﬁnding indicates 
that the association between abnormal audit fees and better audit opinions is due 
primarily to ﬁrms with ROA ≤ 0.01, not to the more proﬁtable ﬁrms. Further analysis (not 
provided in the tables) shows that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient of 
Abfee between ﬁrms with negative ROA (ROA ≤ 0) and those with a small but positive 
level of proﬁtability (0 < ROA ≤ 0.01). Such a result is possible if the improvement in 
ROA is important for a ﬁrm even if it does not cross the threshold of 0.
Table 7 also presents the results with abnormal audit fees calculated from Equation (5) 
using the ratio method in Fang and Hong (2008). The coeﬃcients of Abfee are of the 
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same sign as when these fees are calculated using the regression residuals from Equation 
(4), although they become insigniﬁcant or less signiﬁcant. Our explanation is that the 
abnormal audit fees calculated using the ratio method contain a signiﬁcant portion of 
normal audit fees. Indeed, Equation (4’) re-expresses Equation (4) using the abnormal 
audit fees from the ratio method as the dependent variable, and obtains an R2 of 61.4% 
(not given in the tables). In other words, 61.4% of the variation in abnormal audit fees 
calculated using the ratio method is explainable by other systematic factors. Hence, this 
method does not truly capture these fees, and results based on it are likely to be weaker 
than those obtained with other methods. 
In sum, we conclude that (1) higher abnormal audit fees are associated with better 
audit opinions among ﬁrms with an abnormally large proﬁtability increase but a low 
degree of proﬁtability if these ﬁrms have not switched auditors, controlling for all known 
factors; (2) for all other ﬁrms, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association between abnormal audit 
fees and audit opinions.
5.3. Earnings Quality, Abnormal Audit Fee, and Audit Opinion Change: More Tests
In this paper, we have employed a large increase in profitability as a measure of 
poor earnings quality. To further examine the relationship between abnormal audit fees 
and audit opinion, in this section, we decompose the increase in proﬁtability into an 
increase in cash ﬂows from operations (CFO) and accruals. Because changes in accruals 
often reﬂect changes in CFO, we regress the former on the latter, and use the residuals 
as our measure of abnormal change in accruals. By doing so, we decompose the change 
in proﬁtability into the change in CFO (ΔCFO) and the abnormal change in accruals 
(ΔACR). Again, we divide the sample into three subsamples, X ≤ P75, X > P75, and X > 
P90, where X is either ΔCFO or ΔACR.
Table 8. Ordinal Model of Audit Opinion: Grouping by Accruals and Cash Flows
Abnormal Change in Accruals        Change in Cash Flows from Operations
ΔACR≤P75 ΔACR>P75 ΔACR>P90 ΔCFO≤P75 ΔCFO>P75 ΔCFO>P90
Abfee
-0.399 1.849 1.45 0.044 0.259 -0.441
(-1.17) (3.22***) (2.01**) (0.13) (0.43) (-0.50)
Switch*Abfee
-0.979 -3.059 -1.972 -1.262 -1.767 -0.686
(-1.17) (-2.71***) (-1.31) (-1.63) (-1.34) (-0.34)
Sum
-1.377 -1.210 -0.522 -1.218 -1.508 -1.127
(-1.80*) (-1.26) (-0.39) (-1.77*) (-1.29) (-0.62)
Big4
0.347 -0.536 -0.651 0.182 0.024 -0.386
(0.92) (-0.85) (-0.52) (0.51) (0.03) (-0.34)
ΔROA
3.876 0.329 0.128 1.32 1.755 1.755
(6.41***) (0.70) (0.26) (3.34***) (2.98***) (2.05***)
Size
-0.016 0.306 0.504 0.041 0.324 0.284
(-0.22) (2.79***) (3.47***) (0.60) (2.75***) (1.57)
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Abnormal Change in Accruals        Change in Cash Flows from Operations
ΔACR≤P75 ΔACR>P75 ΔACR>P90 ΔCFO≤P75 ΔCFO>P75 ΔCFO>P90
Loss
-1.773 -2.118 -2.336 -1.964 -1.681 -1.637
(-11.04***) (-8.24***) (-6.86***) (-13.17***) (-6.48***) (-4.08***)
Lastloss
-0.369 -0.327 -0.478 -0.219 -0.968 -1.601
(-2.04**) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.35) (-3.70***) (-4.00***)
ΔLEV
-1.098 -1.072 -0.518 -1.49 -1.062 -1.352
(-1.88*) (-2.30**) (-1.01) (-3.48***) (-1.64) (-1.46)
Growth
0.877 0.942 0.451 1.743 0.857 0.333
(2.42**) (2.51**) (1.08) (5.54***) (2.04**) (0.56)
Switch
0.022 -0.554 -0.585 0.093 -0.774 -0.898
(0.11) (-2.19**) (-1.80*) (0.50) (-3.00***) (-2.25**)
Lastop=-1
-2.589 -2.866 -2.889 -2.901 -1.954 -1.717
(-15.05***) (-10.70***) (-8.07***) (-17.59***) (-7.28***) (-4.33***)
Lastop=-2
-2.881 -3.683 -3.777 -3.181 -3.09 -2.413
(-10.65***) (-9.58***) (-7.39***) (-12.45***) (-8.03***) (-4.39***)
Lastop=-3
-2.721 -3.896 -4.143 -3.273 -2.825 -2.932
(-8.08***) (-9.29***) (-7.69***) (-10.85***) (-6.10***) (-4.13***)
Cut1
-4.658 2.661 6.316 -2.714 2.711 2.01
(-2.98***) (1.14) (2.13**) (-1.88*) (1.09) (0.53)
Cut2
-6.016 0.541 4.01 -4.239 1.015 0.056
(-3.84***) (0.23) (1.36) (-2.94***) (0.41) (0.01)
Cut3
-7.814 -1.105 2.52 -6.000 -0.673 -1.387
(-4.96***) (-0.47) (0.85) (-4.13***) (-0.27) (-0.36)
N 4,919 1,708 717 4,982 1,645 653
Pseudo-R2 37.87% 45.17% 44.20% 39.27% 39.81% 40.65%
Notes: 1. All models include the year dummies. The coeﬃcients and t-values are not presented.
          2. *, **, and *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
          3. “Cut1,” “Cut2,” and “Cut3” represent the intercepts ßi,0, i = -1, -2, and -3 for the ordinal model.
          4. The row entitled “Sum” gives the coeﬃcient sum of Abfee and Switch*Abfee.
          5. The coeﬃcients of Lastop= -j are given in the equation (3) as ß j,0.
Table 8 presents the estimation results from the ordinal model of audit opinion. 
When the sample is grouped by abnormal accruals (ΔACR), the results are similar 
to those using the profitability increase grouping: when the accruals increase is not 
abnormally high (ΔACR ≤ P75), then the coefficient of Abfee is -0.399 (t = -1.17), 
which is not significant at the 0.1 level; for the ΔACR > P75 and ΔACR > P90 
subsamples, the coeﬃcients are 1.849 (t = 3.22) and 1.45 (t = 2.01), both of which are 
positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. These results show that high abnormal audit 
fees are associated with better audit opinions among firms with an abnormally large 
increase in accruals, controlling for all other factors. We ﬁnd no evidence of such an 
association among the other ﬁrms. 
When the sample is classiﬁed on the basis of an increase in cash ﬂows (ΔCFO), the 
coeﬃcients of Abfee are statistically insigniﬁcant for all of the subsamples. This result 
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indicates that when the proﬁtability increase stems from cash ﬂows, which are considered 
to be higher-quality earnings components, there is no evidence of an association between 
abnormal audit fees and audit opinion improvements.
In sum, the results presented in Table 8 confirm that the association between 
abnormal audit fees and audit opinion shopping can be observed only if the firm’s 
earnings quality is questionable.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether a listed ﬁrm can obtain a better audit opinion 
by paying a higher audit fee to its current auditor. Using data from China’s capital 
markets for the 2002 to 2008 period, we examine whether a high abnormal audit fee can 
help ﬁrms to achieve a better audit opinion or avoid being given an unfavorable such 
opinion. 
Building on the existing literature, we conclude that only firms with low-quality 
earnings have an incentive to engage in opinion shopping. In conducting our tests, 
we improve the audit fee model to increase the accuracy of the abnormal audit fee 
measurement. We also introduce an audit opinion deterioration model and an ordinal 
model of audit opinion to allow for a general pattern of audit opinion shopping. 
Our results demonstrate that, among ﬁrms with a large increase in proﬁtability but a 
low degree of proﬁtability, a high abnormal audit fee is associated with a better audit 
opinion, all else being equal. This ﬁnding also holds true if the increase in proﬁtability is 
due to accounting accruals. 
The results presented in this paper suggest that investors and regulators should 
pay special attention to firms that have experienced a large increase in accounting 
proﬁtability that is driven by accruals and that have an unexplained audit fee increase. 
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